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1INFLUENCING THE CLIMATE
Explorations in Interpretive and 
Value-Critical Policy Analysis
Professor Des Gasper
Inaugural Lecture delivered on the 16 December 2010, upon the acceptance of 
the Endowed Chair of Human Development, Development Ethics and Public 
Policy, established by the EUR Trust Fonds, at the International Institute of 
Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
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3Introduction
My academic work is located at the intersection of public policy analysis, ethics 
and international development studies. I begin the lecture by saying something 
about that combination and intersection. Then I will illustrate it, through a 
look at current discussions about responding to anticipated global climate 
change: ‘the craziest experiment mankind has ever conducted’ according to a 
recent editorial in The Economist newspaper (25 Nov. 2010).
The conventional definition of politics – who gets what, when and how – was 
enunciated by Harold Lasswell in the 1930s (Lasswell, 1936). We need to prob-
lematize the ‘who’ and the ‘what’ in that definition, not take them for granted,. 
The ‘who’ in politics is the assumed set of groups and set of identities: what we 
can call ‘the cast of characters’ in the story that is perceived or proposed. The 
‘what’ concerns the valuables that are at stake: not only money, material goods, 
and status; but also meanings, identity, tradition, recognition, respect, and 
achievement of ideals. Both the ‘who’ and the ‘what’ are partly fluid and social-
ly constructed. As put by Murray Edelman, we must look at what influences this 
who and what: ‘what [people] want, what they fear, what they regard as pos-
sible, and even who they are’ (Edelman, 1964:20). Further, adds John Forester, 
politics involves ‘not simply…“who gets what”, but transforming capacities and 
identities, “who can do what” ’ (2009:10). Investigating these complexities leads 
us into interpretive policy analysis, which recognises, in Dvora Yanow’s words, 
that ‘public policies are modes for the expression of human meaning’ (Yanow 
2003: 229; Yanow, 2000).
Unless we problematize the who and the what around which politics revolves, 
and similarly problematize the how and the where, we will fail to adequately 
understand events and will be limited in our ability to influence events. 
Approaches which take for granted the nature of the who—seen as a set of 
given, overwhelmingly self-interested and self-enclosed individuals, or as a set of 
given, overwhelmingly self-interested and self-enclosed nation-states—can often 
mislead us in both explanation and public action.
Interpretive social analysis connects closely to value-critical policy analysis, 
where we think about the value choices faced in public action and the value 
priorities embodied in policy frameworks (e.g., Rein, 1976). Interpretive and 
value-critical approaches are not identical, but are commonly partners. For 
interpretation involves intellectual choices—selection of areas of attention, 
choices of emphasis, choices in conceptualisation, and so on—which express or 
imply value priorities. Values do not enter only at a stage of explicit compari-
son of action alternatives. This is one of the reasons why conventional welfare 
economics has been unsatisfactory for considering the valuative argumentation 
involved in policy analysis. Value-critical analysis includes explorations of sev-
eral types. First, there is philosophical examination of explicit value alternatives 
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4and value choices, as around different conceptions of equity—the sort of explora-
tion done for example by Amartya Sen. Second, linking to interpretive analysis, 
investigation of what people, organisations and disciplines actually do when 
dealing with values and valuative argumentation, including by exploring mean-
ings, worldviews, and interpersonal interactions. Third, not only looking at the 
choices and maneuvers of the powerful, but looking at the situations, interests 
and perspectives of the marginal and disadvantaged, out of human solidarity 
and decency and in order to both learn and assist. This is the agenda of critical 
policy analysis and critical discourse analysis.
My long-term academic interest has thus been in the styles and forms of argu-
mentation in discussions of public policy and policy-related social science, 
including the roles played by different ideas about values and the choices, 
conscious and unconscious, of guiding values. Over the years the concern with 
forms of argumentation has broadened to a concern also with other aspects of 
discourse and rhetoric. I try to apply and contribute to the perspective of inter-
pretive analysis, in various research areas and in teaching. In my talk I’ll illus-
trate this type of approach with some current discussions in the area of climate 
change, especially on how to respond to foreseen changes in climate. The analy-
sis of discourse—of our choices of language and how they structure attention 
and action—can lead to interesting hypotheses; for example that the summary 
label ‘carbon’ that has been used so much in thinking about climate change 
(carbon markets, carbon capture, carbon sinks, carbon tax, decarbonisation, and 
so on) has directed attention excessively towards carbon dioxide emissions and 
away from other vital and maybe more tractable aspects of the climate problem 
(cf. Prins et al., 2010).1
This lecture grows out of current cooperation with scholars in Norway and the 
USA, but the work is at an early stage. Correspondingly, my central aim is to 
say something of wider relevance about doing policy analysis in international 
development studies, rather than to claim to make advances in the analysis of 
climate change or the design of climate change policy. Development studies, 
or international development studies, is an ambitious field as seen in terms 
of contemporary conventional university categories. It represents a revival of 
what we can call the transdisciplinary approaches in earlier phases in the social 
sciences – the style of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, or Max Weber. 
We can also call it humanistic, in several of the senses in which that word has 
been used: first, looking closely at varied human experience; second, reviving 
an earlier, classical, tradition that exemplified this close investigation of varied 
experience, not staying limited only to the knowledge prescribed by current 
authorities; and third, underlying the approach, an ethical concern for human-
ity as a whole.2 3
Let’s begin with an example that fits a lecture about interpretive analysis and 
climate change: academic dress. The sorts of robes that professors wear on such 
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5academic occasions date from the Middle Ages in Europe. They draw on church 
traditions, including traditions of the symbolism of authority and hierarchy; as 
well as on the medieval absence of central heating. Here’s a passage from a pub-
lication from Harvard University written to explain the tradition:
The origin of academic dress dates from the earliest days of the oldest 
universities. When those long-ago centers of learning were taking form 
during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, they were under the juris-
diction of the Catholic church, and the first true scholars were clerics, 
members of the literate class. Their careers, their teaching, studying—
their entire lives—were conducted in the underheated buildings of medi-
eval times, and their clerical robes were needed as much for warmth as 
for distinction. (Rossano, 1999).4
Elaborate forms of hood and robe emerged for senior scholars, the professors, 
along the lines of those for senior clerics. During the so-called mini-Ice Age of 
approximately the late 16th to mid 19th centuries, the period when universities in 
Netherlands were emerging in Leiden, Groningen and Utrecht, these robes were 
no doubt very comforting. Now that the Earth has become somewhat warmer, 
and especially now that central heating has arrived, the message conveyed by 
redfaced scholars is perhaps less dignified than it used to be. Many of us will be 
redfaced too if there proves to be no global warming.
The stickiness of traditions and of academe is germane to my topic. Styles that 
fitted previous eras or types of problems but that do not fit new times or new 
problems are hard to change. There are mental habits as well as physical habits, 
robes of conventional authority. Once we have invested so much meaning in a 
particular set of symbols, how can we switch? To some people academic robes 
even epitomize a stance that lectures to the rest of the world rather than listens, 
and that may not yet see itself as part of one world. However, enveloped in such 
robes today, I would like to draw upon, in contrast, the humanistic, cosmopoli-
tan and exploratory spirit of Erasmus of Rotterdam – a scholar who is of course 
usually portrayed extremely well protected against the cold. 
The topic of climate change calls for inter-disciplinarity, transdisciplinarity, 
humanism, cosmopolitanism and exploration in order to improve our under-
standing and responses. I find it interesting to review some of the many major 
recent studies and reports, and to identify and consider their intellectual 
choices—selection of areas of attention; choices in conceptualisation, choices of 
sources, choices of emphasis, and so on—and the expressed or implied value pri-
orities. We can look at their framing, their values, their cast of characters, their 
forms of argumentation and rhetoric. In today’s lecture I make an introductory 
foray into this territory, looking for possible lines for later more detailed inves-
tigation.
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6Climate Change
The hypothesised structure and scale of the problem
A standard picture of the field of anthropogenic global warming via greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions presents it in terms of five hypothesised stages or steps.5
1. Emission of GHGs:- Human (and natural) activities à GHG emissions
2. Retention of GHGs:- Emitted gases are absorbed, transformed or retained via 
the processes in the ‘carbon cycle’, etc. à Rising GHG levels in the atmos-
phere
3. Effects on temperature:- Increased GHG levels à Global warming
4. Effects on environment:- Warming à Diverse changes in climate and envi-
ronment (e.g., increased variability, more storms, spread of malaria vectors)
5. Effects on persons:- Changes in climate and environment à Impacts on 
human activities and health.
We should add a Step 6. Humans will not just absorb effects, they will react and 
respond. This step has been examined perhaps the least: ‘the body of literature 
looking at the actual implications of climate change is relatively small’ declares 
a study from the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the US 
(Campbell et al., 2007:13). We come back to this later.
Steps 2 and 4 seem essentially beyond human influence, yet alone human con-
trol. Step 3 has long been considered the same, but nowadays aspirant geo-engi-
neers have proposals for avoiding global warming while allowing ever-higher 
GHG emissions and/or levels. Most policy attention has been on step 1, aiming 
for ‘mitigation’ of human-induced emissions, and on step 5, with a focus on 
human ‘adaptation’: adjustments to try to cope with changed climates. These 
two steps are subject to human control, at least in principle. 
Major complexities, lags, and uncertainties exist regarding each of the five links. 
The IPCC, which is presented in the climate sceptic blogosphere as a cabal of 
panicked bureaucrats, seems instead to have responded to the uncertainties by 
being cautious and conservative in its estimates for each of the steps. Increased 
urgency in climate discussions in the last few years reflects worrying new evi-
dence.
Regarding Step 1: “emissions are growing substantially faster than previously 
thought” (Stern, 2010: 22), even than was thought in 2006 when Stern presented 
his Climate Change Review to the UK Government. Regarding Step 2, ocean tem-
peratures are reportedly rising several times faster than was expected (Giddens, 
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72009: 18), and the carbon-absorption capacity of the oceans is estimated as lower 
than was thought a few years ago. Thus Kyoto GHG levels in the atmosphere 
are rising considerably faster than previously expected. However, in Step 3, the 
impact of rising Kyoto GHG concentrations is partly counteracted by the emis-
sion of certain other gases. We receive disturbing reports and analyses about 
actual and expected Step 4 changes in many local climates and their Step 5 
human impacts (see e.g. Stern, 2010). Changed global averages will involve far 
more dramatic and varied local changes - wetter conditions away from the trop-
ics but far drier in much of the tropics and semi-tropics, leading to more forest 
die-off and forest fires; greater variability—‘global weirding’ in Friedman’s words 
(2009: 173); and much warmer conditions near the poles, increasing the likeli-
hood of feedback effects that will enormously increase the release of GHGs. 
Indeed, ‘since the mid-1990s…almost all the scientific evidence has caused 
increased concern that 3 degrees [rise] will not be tolerable’, according to John 
Holdren, President Obama’s chief science advisor (quoted by Friedman 2009: 
164): ice caps are melting faster than foreseen, and the impacts on agriculture 
and the undersea food chain will be considerably worse than thought earlier.6 
Even the previously supposedly safe temperature rise of 2°C will risk danger-
ous impacts. And, under the radar, it will ‘kill a lot of poor people’ according 
to the Director of the UK’s Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research (Kevin 
Anderson, cited by Hamilton, 2010:194). In contrast, the World Bank’s World 
Development Report (WDR) 2010 remains very restrained in describing the 
expected impacts in this sort of scenario:
Warming of 2°C could result in a 4 to 5 percent permanent reduction in 
annual income per capita in Africa and South Asia, as opposed to mini-
mal losses in high-income countries and a global average GDP loss of 
about 1 percent. These losses would be driven by impacts in agriculture, 
a sector important to the economies of both Africa and South Asia (map 
1). It is estimated that developing coun tries will bear most of the costs of 
the damages—some 75–80 percent. (p.5)
We need to distinguish, first, estimates from before the 2007 IPCC Report, that 
have informed much of the economics literature such as the Stern Review; sec-
ond, the 2007 Report itself, which gave a more worrying picture; and third, stud-
ies based on more recent data, which are more worrying still. IPCC estimates 
have always been conservative, perhaps even unwisely so, to try to maintain 
consensus amongst scientists and credibility amongst sceptical audiences of 
politicians, businessmen and others. Arguably, the IPCC has modelled its various 
scenarios within a family that can be called ‘minimum plausible impact’, to test 
whether even the minimum sensible family of estimates show impending crisis 
– which they now do. Conceivably, this strategy has soft-pedalled the issue so 
that insufficient urgency has been felt, until a stage when there is a danger that 
it could already be too late. (Scientists say in return that some of the policy dis-
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8cussions on end-targets for CO
2
-e ppm levels have misunderstood the atmospher-
ic science discussions, since cumulative emissions are what matter.) Estimates 
in the last four years or so about the various linkages are far more worrying 
than even the estimates published in the 2007 IPCC assessment. But conversely, 
it remains possible that the IPCC interpretation is mistaken.
The IPCC Report of 2007 reported a likely warming of between 2.4 and 4.6 
degrees worldwide (much more in some locations) by 2100 if GHG emissions 
continue to grow as at present (Hamilton, 2010:7). The studies based on newer 
data indicate that the processes at work are leading us outside even the most 
pessimistic IPCC projection. A new report from UNEP shows that if all pledged 
emissions reductions are implemented the picture for global warming is now 
about the same as in the previously expected business-as-usual scenario.
Unep’s analysis shows that even if governments implement all they have 
pledged to do, that would “...imply a temperature increase of between 
2.5-5 degrees C [from pre-industrial times] before the end of the century”. 
As the global average temperature is already about 0.7°C above pre-
industrial times, this implies that anything up to 4°C during the coming 
century is possible.7
The current picture from large numbers of climate scientists appears grim. 
Many now consider that such temperature rises (perhaps even a two degree 
rise), are probably more than enough, except in a very favourable case, to gradu-
ally melt the Greenland icesheet and raise sea levels worldwide by seven metres 
(Hamilton, 2010:198). The West Antarctic icesheet could follow suit, with a simi-
lar additional impact. Once the melting of these icesheets gets firmly underway, 
it becomes almost unstoppable, given the nature of the processes involved.8 The 
densely populated deltas of the world would be doomed (Campbell et al., 2007: 
Scenario 3). Rather than talking with Stern of a 500 ppm GHG target (including 
perhaps 440 ppm CO
2
) and a near 3 degrees temperature rise, some scientists 
argue that any sustained carbon dioxide level above 350 ppm (the present figure 
is 390) may eventually melt the ice caps, with an increasing probability of doing 
so the higher is the temperature (James Hansen, cited by Dyer 2010:66). Thus 
most climate scientists would advise nothing more than a 1.5°C rise above pre-
industrial temperatures, reports Dyer (2010:270). We are already half way there, 
and most of the further acceptable warming is already in the climate system 
pipeline.9
One likely factor contributing to the rapid obsolescence of the IPCC projec-
tions is that in the 2007 report ‘The risk of climate feedbacks is generally not 
included’ (Working Group III Report, IPCC 2007:173): for example the danger 
that the carbon embedded in Siberian permafrost—‘more than currently resides 
in the atmosphere’ (Woolsey, 2007:83)—will thanks to warmer temperatures be 
released as methane, greatly accelerating the greenhouse effect. Evidence has 
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9started to mount that some of these Step 3 and Step 4 feedbacks that reinforce 
and accelerate global warming could have begun, ‘much earlier than expected’ 
(Dyer, 2010:3). The 2007 CNA study uses models that includes some—not even 
all—of the feedbacks in order to justify its third scenario, ‘Catastrophic Climate 
Change’ (Gulledge, 2007: 39; see sources cited there).10 
Hamilton’s recent book Requiem for a Species calculates that :
..even with the most optimistic set of assumptions—the ending of defor-
estation, a halving of the emissions associated with food production, 
global emissions peaking in 2020 and then falling by 3 percent a year for 
a few decades—we have no chance of preventing emissions well above a 
number of critical tipping points that will spark uncontrollable climate 
change. The Earth’s climate would enter a chaotic era lasting thousands 
of years… (Hamilton, 2010: 21-2).  
The critical changes include ‘the disappearance of summer sea-ice in the Arctic, 
the melting of the Greenland icesheet, the melting of the West Antarctic 
icesheet, the release of carbon from melting permafrost [in Siberia], and large-
scale die-back of the Amazon rain-forest’ (ibid.:25). ‘…even with urgent and sus-
tained global action it seems unlikely that we will be able to keep the Earth’s 
temperature from rising by anything less than 3ºC’ (ibid.:8). This could eventu-
ally trigger a relatively rapid ‘tipping’ of the whole climate system, many cli-
mate scientists fear.11 The picture contrasts with the comforting scenario of an 
‘environmental Kuznets curve’: the idea that economic growth becomes clean 
in later stages and generates the resources to clean up after itself. That scenario 
assumes that we do not reach any tipping points in nature before the time that 
we get round to cleaning-up our act.
Hamilton’s projections are those of a disillusioned Green philosopher. But a 
leading voice in contemporary capitalism, The Economist newspaper, wrote some-
what similarly in a lead editorial a few weeks ago, noting how small has been 
the world’s appetite for reduction of greenhouse gas emissions: ‘Even if the 
currently moderate pace of emissions reduction steps up, the likelihood is that 
the Earth will be at least 3°C warmer at the end of this century than it was at 
the start of the industrial revolution’ (25 Nov. 2010, editorial). Remember that 
3 degrees was the figure given last year by both Nicholas Stern and President 
Obama’s chief scientific advisor as beyond the range of reasonable risk. One 
recent survey suggests that ‘more than half of climate scientists now believe 
that cutting emissions will no longer be enough to avoid the worst and [that] we 
will be forced to pursue the radical and dangerous route of engineering the glo-
bal climate’ (Hamilton, 2010:5).12
So, a 3-4°C rise is perhaps now seen as the realistic expectation or attainable 
target by most climate scientists (Hamilton 2010:192), rather than the 2 degrees 
that was for long the hope, and for good reason, the target. An average of four 
binnenwerk brochure gasper.indd   9 12/13/10   11:19 AM
10
degrees warmer means far higher rises in the polar areas and across land areas. 
As with the human body, a few degrees temperature rise can be fatal, proposes 
Dyer (2010:44), since for example it takes many crops in many parts of the world 
outside of their range of temperature tolerance.13 We are talking not only about 
Africa and South Asia. Steven Chu, the US Secretary of Energy, is quoted as say-
ing: ‘We’re looking at a scenario where there’s no more agriculture in California 
[and] I don’t actually see how they can keep their cities going’ (5 Feb. 2009; Dyer, 
2010: 181; see Fuerth, 2007, for similar views).
From all this: What are social scientists to do? We don’t fully understand the 
natural science, which anyway remains subject to considerable uncertainty 
even within the mainstream, and the mainstream is liable to refutation. And 
we seem to be confronting processes—both natural and social—of such immense 
momentum and/or inertia that they could be beyond human powers to suffi-
ciently understand or manage. In answer to the scientific uncertainty, Thomas 
Friedman’s version of Pascal’s wager makes sense to me: there are numerous 
major needed reforms that can counter greenhouse-gas induced warming and 
that are strongly desirable on other grounds too. In response to the possible 
relevance or irrelevance of social science: that is part of what we need to study 
and reflect on. Regardless of whether the earth is entering a phase of dangerous 
warming, or as some insist instead gradually oscillating towards the next Ice 
Age, or neither, climate change and variability will be on the human agenda. 
I think that several themes of this talk will remain relevantin this and other 
policy areas:- first, that the rich cause far more damage and are better protected 
against both that damage and natural events, while the poor cause far less dam-
age yet are far more vulnerable to harm; second, that the rich know less than 
they think, and need to listen to the poor, including also to establish a basis for 
cooperation; third, that the rich are less invulnerable than they often think, and 
are likely to be damaged too if they seek to marginalise rather than accommo-
date the poor; and fourth, that humanistic skills of interpretive analysis, includ-
ing of discourse analysis, are central to this listening, learning and cooperation.
Overview of responses to anticipated climate change
Hulme (2009:161 ff) identifies three main families of proposed responses: mar-
ket-based solutions, applying principles of justice, and transforming lifestyles. 
Later he gives a modified classification, replacing the justice-based response 
by ‘ecological modernisation’ that stresses investment in green technologies. 
Hybrid positions are of course also possible. I will use instead a set of underly-
ing dimensions for comparison. First, is the challenge of climate change seen as 
a routine, though complex, policy challenge, requiring a routine even if huge 
response through mobilization and application of existing conventional policy 
tools, or, is it seen as unprecedented, requiring a transformational response? 
Of course these issues concern continuous dimensions rather than either-or 
choices. To convey something of the spectrum, Figure 1 allocates some studies 
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that I have read, across three categories in each dimension rather than just two. 
We see a fairly strong tendency to follow the diagonal, which suggests that cor-
relation in the two dimensions is high. However there is also a conservative ten-
dency: in other words in several cases we see a fairly radical diagnosis combined 
with a less radical response. These are in the cells shaded grey.
Figure 1: Challenge and response – some leading recent climate change policy   
 studies
ROUTINE 
RESPONSE
Intermediate 
response
TRANSFORMATIONAL 
RESPONSE
ROUTINE 
CHALLENGE 
Stiglitz 2006
WDR 2010
Intermediate 
challenge 
Stern 2007
Stern 2010
Hulme 2009 
Hartwell 2010
UNPRECEDENTED 
CHALLENGE 
UNDP 2008 (= 
HDR 2007-8)
Giddens 2009 
T. Friedman 
2009
Campbell et al. 
2007
Jackson 2010 (post-
growth)
Dyer 2010 (accepts 
geo-engineering)
Hamilton 2010 (both 
those)
For example, Anthony Giddens in his book The Politics of Climate Change recognis-
es that we face an exceptional challenge, not least because of what he christens 
‘Giddens’ paradox’: that because negative effects are long delayed and uncertain 
in detail we don’t do anything about the behaviour that causes them until the 
effects become manifest, by which time it will be too late. He also calls this the 
teenage smoker principle. It rests on our limited ‘telescopic faculty’ and/or on 
what we can call our limited self-solidarity. For climate change that is a partly 
misleading analogy: nearly all the negative effects of our actions concern other 
people, mainly in future generations, so the problem may instead lie in lack of 
empathy and solidarity. Giddens’ formulation may reflect an implicit national 
or regional perspective: the ‘we’ is a rich nation wondering how far it can main-
tain its current lifestyle. Speaking though of the global ‘we’, we have reached 
the stage where negative effects of climate change have already begun. They are 
likely to substantially affect most people now alive, sometimes enormously, so 
that in this sense the teenage smoker analogy is at least suggestive.
Having identified a profound difficulty, Giddens rejects and even resents many 
transformational response proposals, including for a Green lifestyle revolution. 
Writing as a member of the British House of Lords, Giddens shows no orienta-
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tion to Southern experience and the hazards endured by ordinary people there. 
He rejects the Precautionary Principle, disliking its conventional oversimple 
wording. We face risks in whichever direction we move, so we cannot choose 
by a principle of avoiding risks. But Giddens may miss the core point, suggested 
by John Holdren as follows: ‘we’re driving in a car with bad brakes in a fog and 
heading for a cliff. We know for sure now that the cliff is out there, we just 
don’t know exactly where it is. Prudence would suggest that we should start 
putting on the brakes’ (quoted by Friedman, 2009: 160). An analogy and a story-
form can convey a message more vividly, and in some ways more richly and 
insightfully, than many abstracted formulations. The story conveys concrete 
aspects that we struggle to capture adequately in a generalised rule such as the 
Precautionary Principle.
The second main dimension of comparison concerns whether we can under-
stand climate change issues using mechanical methodologies – as if we are try-
ing to understand a complex system of machinery – or whether we also require 
interpretive methodologies, fitted to understanding innovative, creative systems 
of meaning-makers. Third, is the viewpoint that from a Northern metropolitan 
centre of power or is it more global in perspective, awareness and sympathies? 
Figure 2 uses these dimensions.
Figure 2: Responses classified in terms of viewpoint and methodology
MECHANICAL 
METHODOLOGY
Intermediate
INTERPRETIVE 
METHODOLOGY
NORTHERN 
VIEWPOINT Stern 2007
Giddens
Friedman
Hulme 
Jackson
Intermediate
Stiglitz 
World Devt. 
Rep. 2010
Stern 2010
Campbell et al. 
GLOBAL 
VIEWPOINT
Human Devt. 
Rep. 2007-8
Hamilton 
Dyer
The distributions in the two tables show some similarities, which suggests a pos-
sible pattern:- the less mechanical and more interpretive the methodology, and 
the broader the source of perceptions that steers it, the more serious is felt to be 
the challenge posed by climate change and the more fundamental the required 
response. As a result I will make an ideal-typical contrast between three types 
of response: a ‘Northern technocratic orientation’; a ‘Northern political orienta-
tion’; and a ‘global political orientation’. Correspondingly, I take three authors 
in more detail, while referring to several others. I highlight Stern and Hulme, 
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both very prominent currently, and Dyer, who explicitly tells stories and whose 
book is thereby the most vivid of the set.
Stern and his critics
Nicholas Stern is a distinguished development economist who has become a 
major contemporary figure in the climate policy debate. He in some ways repre-
sents the evolution of mainstream development economics better than anyone 
else. An early elaborator of economic cost-benefit analysis, he was the invited 
author of the Economic Journal’s survey article on development economics in 
1989 and spoke out there against basic needs approaches when they had become 
unfashionable (Stern, 1989). A dozen years later when Chief Economist of the 
World Bank, he championed basic needs approaches when they had returned to 
favour in the Millennium Development Goals. He has remained faithful always 
to a type of economics centred around understanding and compensating for 
‘market failures’, as seen already in his 1960s cost-benefit analyses. As head 
of the UK Government’s review of climate change in 2006 he boldly applied 
cost-benefit analysis to the future of the species, claiming that mitigation of 
global warming was a very attractive investment (Stern, 2007). His calculations 
provoked furious reactions from some economists who considered that a dis-
count rate that reflected a commitment to perpetuation of the species was an 
arbitrary inserted value as opposed to accepting a discount rate based on mar-
ket interest rates which reflected the revealed preferences of actually existent 
(monied) humans. I focus here on Stern’s new  book, A Blueprint for A Safer Planet, 
rather than on the Stern Review: it presents some new arguments and responds 
to comments and criticism.
Stern’s diagnosis and proposal, and Giddens’ critique
Stern uses the five-step picture of the problem structure of climate change 
which we saw earlier. He adds his standard diagnosis: we face a market failure, 
indeed climate change is deemed the biggest market failure ever. Market-based 
economics thus guides his elaboration of the problem-structure and suggests 
part of the indicated response: improve the system of markets. But he does not 
use economics to determine an optimum level of pollution, unlike for example 
William Nordhaus. A ceiling level of acceptable pollution (GHG concentration) is 
set based on understandings from outside economics, including a commitment 
to tolerable climate conditions for all people around the planet and in genera-
tions to come. Stern still likes to describe this as the ‘economics of risk’—adopt-
ing emissions ceilings set in light of our knowledge of the links from emissions 
to climate change—which is then to be partnered by the ‘economics of cost’, 
ensuring economic efficiency by using markets to allocate emission rights (2010, 
Ch.6).
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Stern applies standard policy economics to devise a set of instruments—‘carrots’ 
and ‘sticks’ (Bemelmans-Videc et al., 1998)—to induce, motivate, and oblige 
behaviours that may efficiently attain the intended emissions path. He com-
bines incentives for creation and adoption of suitable technologies, regulations 
about required performance standards and maximum permissible emissions, 
and auctioned tradable emissions quotas within overall annual ceilings on emis-
sions. He prefers emissions permits over a carbon tax, which he considers too 
unreliable in guaranteeing the required behaviour. 
According to sceptical observers (see e.g. Prins et al., 2010), Stern’s implied cast 
of characters are taken from an economics textbook, not from real markets. He 
believes that cap-and-trade schemes will be genuine, rather than a manipula-
tors’ paradise of notional carbon offsets. In contrast Thomas Friedman believes 
in the past rather than in abstract economic models for informing us about how 
corporations will behave in the future (Friedman, 2009:327): often by illicitly 
buying support and by being economical, with the truth. Stern’s characters are 
thin in another sense too: they communicate through monetary signals rather 
than also centrally through attention-altering actions and assertions. Stern may 
thus miss the semiotic significance of a carbon tax, the clear message it gives 
about need for a ‘change [in] the perception of the challenge we are facing’ 
(Friedman, 2009: 312). What people perceive and accept and respect as carrots 
and sticks depends on their frame of reference and, to use an old term, their 
‘moral economy’; so too does what they perceive and accept as a relevant and 
feasible ideal, an inspiring idea, or a binding commitment.14
Stern moves on in his Ch.8 to design a ‘global deal’ to operationalise his 
approach: trying to attain the required emissions reductions while sufficiently 
accomodating the interests of each nation. The features of such a proposed deal 
are now widely familiar. Rich countries must commit to rapid large GHG emis-
sions cuts (20-40% by 2020, and at least 80% by 2050) and must invest in develop-
ing new technologies. After a grace period that respects low income countries’ 
needs to grow economically and their lack of responsibility for past accumu-
lated emissions, those countries should after 2020 also adopt binding (lesser) 
targets for emissions reduction, provided that rich countries have met their 
commitments and that support is available to help the poorer countries pay for 
adaptation to climate change. Stern envisages that such costs can be covered by 
the flows associated with a global carbon market.
For Giddens, Stern’s blueprint (in the 2008 version that preceded the book) is 
naively apolitical:
Extraordinarily, there is no mention of politics in Stern’s discussion, no 
analysis of power, or of the tense nature of international relations. It as 
if the ‘global deal’ will be reached as soon as the nations of the world see 
reason. ‘All must play their part’ – yes, but who is there to implement the 
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‘must’? Stern places an enormous amount of faith in carbon markets, yet 
they depend upon prior political support. (Giddens, 2009:201)
Giddens correspondingly called his own book The Politics of Climate Change. He 
finds Stern’s global deal, like the whole Kyoto treaty model, too unitary and 
universal and too cumbersome (pp. 192, 220). Preoccupied with setting targets 
for everyone, it cannot work in face of all the real constraints. We need instead 
to focus on myriad diverse fora, initiatives and experiments, and to move ahead 
through coalitions of the willing. 
Underlying ‘Giddens’ paradox’ are not only selfishness (‘I’ll be gone’), pessimism 
(‘It’s too late already’) and weakness of ‘telescopic faculty’ and self-solidarity (the 
teenage smoker principle), but in addition the competitive dynamics of elec-
tion politics in mass societies. His Chapter 4 records in detail the hesitation of 
politicians to intervene in the unending expansion of undertaxed air travel. He 
concludes that without perceptual shifts, changes in frames of reference, there 
will never be much progress.
For this, like Thomas Friedman in the best-seller Hot, Flat and Crowded, Giddens 
stresses use of perceptual and material carrots not perceptual sticks. He holds 
that we will get nowhere by only arguing that being Green is ethically good and 
involves obligations to cut-back for the sake of others. Instead we need to seek 
and present appealing visions that show that Green is good for you, the individ-
ual consumer, by emphasising its contributions to energy security, further eco-
nomic advance, and well-being improvement.15 Contrary to examples of respons-
es in wartime, Giddens backs the generalized claim that people respond favour-
ably to perceived opportunities and not to threats. He is even, unlike Friedman, 
‘hostile’ (Giddens, 2009:106) to exhortations and recipe-books for changing one’s 
lifestyle; not for the reason Hamilton gives, that they still focus our minds on 
forms of consumption, but because he considers them counterproductive and 
over-demanding. He similarly opposes carbon rationing, as ‘impractical and 
unfeasible’ (p.158), and supports additional taxes only if they are hypothecated 
to support specific Green expenditures or otherwise have a directly visible 
beneficial impact (p.106), not if they are only intended to discourage activities 
deemed to be damaging.
While interested in reframing issues, Giddens does not go far in problematizing 
the ‘who’ and the ‘what’ in politics. He seems to think only of the short-term. 
His characters are not subject to change. In fact, Stern in his recent book offers a 
reply, of a sort, to Giddens, even though a rather surprising and incomplete one.
Stern tacitly accepts that motives of narrow self-interest, that guide responses 
to policy sticks and carrots, will not be enough for an environmental transition. 
We need attention also to other types of motivation and of behaviour-change. 
He devotes three chapters to ‘how to motivate action’ (2010:124), including 
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in effect through use of what we can call ‘sermons and dialogues’ (Sinha and 
Gasper, 2009). He looks at the use of special national fora to generate ideas 
and commitment; at campaigns to influence attitudes and practices; and, now 
warming to the requirements of influencing the climate, he eventually appeals 
for ‘a spirit of collaboration’, ‘commitment and communication’, to be inspired 
by the examples of Gandhi and Mandela (pp. 181, 182, 182-3) ! Having moved 
beyond economic cost-benefit analysis for answering questions of objectives, 
using instead cost-effectiveness analysis to see how to move towards objectives 
selected for (in effect) human rights reasons, Stern now tries to combine his 
orthodox public economics with the humanistic outlook of the leaders of two 
great liberation struggles.16
We see thus two, unintegrated, parts of Stern’s story – roughly, Gandhi plus 
a new path for economic growth. He also mixes two images of persons and 
motives: the sort of altruistic image used by global change movements and in 
literature on social entrepreneurship, and the sort seen in mainstream econom-
ics textbooks. Is he tacitly referring to different groups in a society and/or to 
different arenas of action? We see the same dualism in much other writing. Let 
me say a little bit about, first, growth, and, second, Gandhi. The two topics are 
perhaps not as distant as they may appear. In both cases some commentators 
detect a religious strand. And in both cases we can engage in some preliminary 
discourse analysis: looking for the rhetorical trump cards that different authors 
use, and for their key assumptions, including about principles of value and 
about who are the characters in their storyline and what characteristics they 
bear.
The valuation of economic growth
Stern, like Giddens and Thomas Friedman, is committed to endlessly ongoing 
economic growth in rich countries. Friedman still emphatically believes in 
continuing economic growth as potentially welfare-giving. Stern and Giddens 
are perhaps more reticent here, but see growth as at least politically unavoid-
able. Stern assumes repeatedly and explicitly that, to get political support for 
any national or international deals, growth must be seen to go on and on. This 
forces his projections of the required cuts in emissions-intensity (the volume of 
GHGs generated per unit of national or global output) to be so ambitious: 80% 
cuts worldwide by 2050 (Stern, 2010:41), merely to maintain a 500 ppm GHG 
level. The World Development Report 2010 reassures us that ‘there is no reason to 
think that a low-carbon path must necessarily slow economic growth’ (World 
Bank, 2009:7) – no reason.17
One underlying factor, says Tim Jackson in his book Prosperity Without Growth, 
is the structure of a capitalist economy. Zero growth or negative growth will 
mean more unemployment, loss of government revenues, increase of social 
security payments, budgetary crisis and possible generalized economic crisis. As 
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on a treadmill, one must keep running in order not to be swept away. There are 
ways to try to redesign the economic structure to avoid this bind. The agitation 
engendered by such discussions of phasing-out growth is so great that many 
authors diagnose in addition underlying political, psychological and cultural 
sources: there is a ‘social logic’ of permanent growth as well as an economic 
treadmill. The past one or two generations have seen in rich countries the emer-
gence of a huge social world of individuals who define themselves through new 
purchases (Jackson, 2009; Hamilton, 2010).18
We see recurrent severe confusion in political, business and media discourses 
between the terms wealth, well-being, output, and growth. Thomas Friedman, 
perhaps the most prominent journalist in the world, illustrates this. For him 
‘energy and resource productivity means—more growth from less stuff’ (p.232). 
He should say ‘equal value of output from less stuff’, but the word ‘growth’ 
seems to function as a talisman of the good. He keeps on repeating it. For exam-
ple, we must keep ‘innovating better ways to drive growth with fewer and fewer 
electrons’ (p.232). Our already existing wealth is not enough. We must ‘find a 
way to create wealth—because everyone wants to live better—without creating 
toxic assets in the financial world or the natural world that [will] overwhelm 
us’, says Friedman (2009:9). We must have more: we want it, and, by assump-
tion, economic growth is the only way for even rich countries to live better.
Friedman’s journalistic ear makes him better than Giddens and Stern at periodi-
cally catching other tones. Within his book’s 500 pages we find appeals, mainly, 
to the can-do spirit of U.S. engineering, the magic of the market, and American 
nationalism. At a few points though he adds that ‘Without an ethic of conserva-
tion…the availability of abundant, clean, reliable, cheap electrons would turn 
into a license to rape our natural world’, an intensified orgy of consumerism 
(p.236); without a love of nature, money values alone will never bring conserva-
tion (p.370). And deeper, without our paying attention to nature, being aware and 
appreciative, none of the other policy tools will suffice (p.372). Yet Friedman’s 
Green ethic soon returns to: More, More, More – the goal of an ‘environment in 
which you, your company, and your community are constantly thinking about 
how to generate more growth, more mobility, more housing, more comfort, 
more security, more enjoyment, and more packaging from the most innovative 
use of the cleanest electrons and fewest resources’ (p.380). This chant connects 
to his dominant nationalism: greening is presented as ‘the best way to re-ener-
gize America, rebuild its self confidence and moral authority’ (p.391).
Often, economic growth is presented as an essential part of modern identity: the 
source of hope, meaning, and self-profiling, at the level of individuals and espe-
cially of nations. It becomes the token of national strength, virility and vitality, 
‘the symbol of life itself’ (Hamilton, 2010:64; Gasper, 2009). ‘Growth is the name 
of the game’, in the words of former US Secretary of State and Secretary of the 
Treasury, George P. Shultz (interview on CNN, 14.11.10). Arguably it becomes 
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a channel for religious feeling, a source of ultimate orientation that cannot 
be questioned; ‘religious value seems now to be invested in the most profane 
object, growth of the economy, which at the individual level takes the form of 
the accumulation of material goods’ (Hamilton, 2010:33).
This accumulation is supposedly so important that some months of foregone 
economic growth outweigh the costs of stabilizing the climate, in the judge-
ment of certain leading economists. The 2007 IPCC report’s maximum estimate 
for the cost of reducing emissions to 450 ppm CO
2
-e in 2050 was 5.5 % of world 
GDP. ‘Most models show lower costs’ (Hamilton, 2010:50). Of course the resourc-
es to be mobilised must pass through some organisations’ budgets and be ceded 
by others, and represent enormous sums, but Hamilton attempts to put them in 
perspective. Even the IPCC maximum estimate is equivalent to only two years’ 
foregone growth, foregone in order to greatly reduce chances of disaster. In the 
case of the Stern Review,  the estimates for achieving 450 ppm and thus avoid-
ing destabilising the world climate were a bit over a year of foregone growth. 
This was judged to be too expensive. ‘It is acceptable, according to Stern, to ask 
people to wait an extra five months for their incomes to double but it is too 
much to ask them to wait a little more than a year’ (Hamilton, 2010: 54). Taking 
serious additional risks with our future, by instead going up to 550 ppm, was 
deemed the proper balance. 
The leading climate economist William Nordhaus calculates that market valua-
tions imply that the economically optimal path will be ‘to set the global thermo-
stat at 2.6 degrees C [warmer] for the end of this century, rising to 3.5 degrees 
C [warmer] by 2200’, while most climate scientists think that this risks catastro-
phe, says Hamilton (2010:61). According to Hamilton, these sorts of economic 
cost-benefit approaches to climate policy are part of a conception in which 
humans are seen as ‘radically separated  from the world around them, and can 
therefore regard it [exclusively] as a realm that provides goods and services for 
human benefit’ (Hamilton, 2010:54).19 Earth’s climate system is seen as ‘like a 
central heating system that can be smoothly adjusted to a desired temperature’ 
(p.62). The complexities of the climate system, including the various potentially 
disastrous feedback effects, make this conception crazily inappropriate accord-
ing to many observers. The gulf between the approach of some economists and 
that of apparently the majority of climate scientists seems disturbingly wide. 
The World Development Report on climate change, published last year, presents 
the Stern Review as on the pessimistic side, even though most of its assump-
tions have since proven too optimistic. The Report uses economic cost-benefit 
analysis as a guide, and respectfully cites Nordhaus’s calculations (Box 3, p.8). 
It adds though that these indicate that the extra costs of keeping warming to 
2.5 or 2 degrees rather than 3 or 3.5 degrees are relatively small, since reduced 
adaptation costs largely offset extra mitigation costs. ‘The results therefore sug-
gest that the cost of precautionary mitigation to 550 ppm is small’ (p.8) – less 
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than half a per cent of economic product, which is presented as a reasonable 
cost for climate insurance.20 
Mentioned in one sentence in the WDR’s huge Overview chapter are an extra 
three million deaths per year from malnutrition due to crop failures in the busi-
ness-as-usual scenario leading to 5 degrees warming (p.5). Even in the optimistic 
2 degrees warming scenario: ‘Between 100 million and 400 million more people 
could be at risk of hunger. And 1 billion to 2 billion more people may no longer 
have enough water to meet their needs’ (p.5). Such deaths carry little weight in 
economic cost-benefit analysis if they occur amongst the global poor. 
The spirit of Gandhi and Mandela ?
Stern invokes the spirit of Gandhi and Mandela, but does not expound it. The 
notion has become part of a conventional rhetorical repertoire; Mandela and 
Gandhi are nowadays marketing icons. But what was their spirit? Tactically, 
Gandhi and Mandela had exceptional skills in mobilising diverse groups around 
a new shared agenda. These skills of re-framing, to build unity, were not mere 
marketing tricks but were tied to an ethical agenda. The substance of the agen-
da was radically humanist and, in the case of Gandhi, radically anti-consumer-
ist. In the case of Mandela, the example that is widely used to show his refram-
ing skills, his response to the murder of Chris Hani, was precisely to maintain 
unity across divides (Carlin 2009; Kahane, 2010). Mandela is not an anti-consum-
erism campaigner, but his career exemplifies commitment to others and, as he 
declared in his Rivonia trial speech, not priority to his own comfort (Mandela, 
1995: 395). His commitment to the oppressed in his own group relied on and 
reinforced his universal sympathy, eloquently expressed in his realisation that 
he needed to help free South Africa’s whites too, from hatred and narrow-mind-
edness. He perceived a potential for sympathy and decency in everyone, even his 
jailors (Mandela, 1995: 749-751).
Viewed critically, one might interpret a combination of Gandhi and the growth 
ethic as showing incoherence (see Gasper, 2010a). Gandhi and Mandela are 
invoked as icons, magicians who will reconcile the irreconcilable. Viewed 
kindly, one might say that eclecticism is part of an attempt at bridge-building, 
across inevitable gaps between different intellectual communities, different 
climates of opinion, using whatever ‘boundary objects’ are available for trying 
to span particular gulfs. At some sorts of interface, such as those served by the 
Stern Review, economic cost-benefit evaluation is a mutually understandable 
and tolerated language. Discourse analysis attempts to understand discourses in 
this way, situating them in their social contexts, and to better understand the 
contexts through examining their discourses. 
The invocation of Gandhi and Mandela reflects also an awareness that action 
depends on emotions, not only reason. Hulme remarks (2009:202) that most peo-
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ple’s affective systems have not yet been triggered by climate change dangers, 
even if their analytic reasoning systems may recognise a serious issue. The issue 
though is not how to market a correct economics-based solution to an emo-
tional herd. The economics-based solution is not adequate. An analysis based 
exclusively on self-interest will not provide an adequate response to problems of 
public goods, including global public goods; it is always liable to be undermined 
by free-riding, corruption of the regulators, and other inroads of self-interest. 
Public goods rely also on public spirit, a sense of solidarity and identity with a 
larger community. That is the spirit of Gandhi and Mandela. 
The building of systems of wider solidarity is a long story. In standard econom-
ics, we usually tell detective stories: intricate plots with rather simple char-
acters. Precisely because the characters are relatively simple we can, by exact 
analysis, predict what they will do and deduce what they have done. The char-
acterisation is simple in several respects. First, the motives are relatively sim-
ple – maximization of some utility function, typically self-interest, sometimes 
even self-interest seen only in a monetary sense. Second, the cast of characters 
is relatively restricted: there are not many types of people, instead all have this 
same sort of utility function, even though its exact content varies: some like 
coffee, some like tea, which contributes to the scope for mutual gain through 
exchange. Third, the characters stay the same, they don’t change much during 
the story. Some may get richer, some poorer, but their personalities and views 
do not fundamentally change. A detective story is not a Bildungsroman, a story 
of the evolution and maturation of a personality. But in much of public policy, 
and not least when considering development ethics and human development, 
we are talking Bildungsroman. In a reductionist telling of public policy as if it 
was just a detective story, a technical puzzle, then in John Forester’s words ‘the 
transformations of done-to into doers, spectators and victims into activists, frag-
mented groups into renewed bodies, old resignation into new beginnings, are 
lost from our view’ (1999:115). Certainly those transformations were what occu-
pied Gandhi and Mandela.21 
Certainly too, something was missing from the ingredients that went into the 
2009 Copenhagen COP conference, one year back.
The Copenhagen debacle
Gwynne Dyer (2010) describes how the parties in the Copenhagen COP process 
seriously sought an agreement but how their assumptions and habits got in the 
way.
When we examine the strategy and tactics of various players at and 
before the Copenhagen conference, there will be much to criticise, but 
it is important to remember that almost everybody there was genuinely 
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concerned about global warming, and wanted to achieve an agreement 
that addressed the problem seriously. (pp.190-1)
… a number of Western countries, including the United States, the 
United Kingdom and the host of the conference, Denmark, calling them-
selves the ‘circle of commitment’ were secretly working on a draft pro-
posal that would replace the whole Kyoto process with a new treaty that 
obliged developing countries to make emissions cuts in return for finan-
cial aid. The draft also envisaged that even in 2050, the permitted emis-
sions per person should be almost twice as high in developed countries 
as in developing countries. (p.200)
This is like holding a meeting on ‘global justice’ that never addresses the justice 
of the global economic and political system, and only looks at the global judicial 
system and how to administer the existing economic-political system in a more 
orderly way. 
… [Further] The ‘Danish text’ in effect sought to put…three types of aid 
together, and turn them into a lever by which the rich countries could 
force the poor to reduce their emissions [which they had been exempted 
from in the 1997 Kyoto accord] (p.201). [Dyer explains elsewhere the three 
types of aid: 1. conventional development aid, offered on a basis of solidarity, 
mutual benefit and historical obligation; 2. aid to contribute to climate change 
adaptation – such aid is an historic obligation of rich countries to poor countries, 
since the rich have caused nearly all of the problem and the poor have to suffer 
the greater part of the consequences; and 3. aid to contribute to climate change 
mitigation. These three types have quite different justifications and to try to 
tie adaptation aid – which the North owes the South – to Southern agreements 
on mitigation was, he considers, both immoral and stupid.] To imagine that 
such a change could be successfully foisted upon the poor countries at 
Copenhagen was simply breathtaking in its ignorance and arrogance. 
Equally detached from reality were the proposals in the ‘Danish text’ to 
establish a two-tier world of different emissions rights for rich and poor 
countries [see above], in effect institutionalising current inequalities, 
and to give control over the choice of who gets climate-related aid to 
the deeply unloved, Western controlled, World Bank. The document was 
presumably intended to be sprung on the conference at the end, when 
all the world leaders were assembled and the negotiations had reached 
deadlock, but it was (of course) leaked before the conference even began, 
and caused huge anger among the intended victims. (p.201)
This disastrous approach by rich Western governments was not the only prob-
lem. None of the big emitters who had previously been excluded from and/or 
rejected and/or ignored commitments under the Kyoto accord – the USA and 
some of its allies like Canada; plus China, India and Brazil – were willing to 
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accept specific targets for reductions. At China’s insistence even the long-hori-
zon targets that had long been part of the Kyoto process – that the world needs 
to reduce emissions by 50 per cent by 2050, as part of which the rich countries 
must reduce emissions by 80 per cent – were eliminated, perhaps because China 
expects to be a rich/developed country by 2050 (p.205). But, suggests Dyer, this 
retrogression emerged in reaction to the selfish and manipulative Western tac-
tics seen in the ‘Danish text’, which provided the opportunity for growth-gives-
strength elements in the Chinese ruling elite to win, despite widespread aware-
ness in that elite of climate change and its huge present and future impacts in 
China, such as the rapid shrinking of the glaciers that feed its rivers.  
So the Kyoto process was in effect abandoned. The Copenhagen conference 
produced no agreement on a follow-up, only a statement from the big emitters 
which was almost rejected by the conference and was in the end merely ‘noted’ 
(Dyer, 2010:209). Even if all the offers on the table had been confirmed, it would 
have matched a scenario of 3°C warming. Thank God for geo-engineering, con-
cludes Dyer. He himself likes the notion of reflecting back solar radiation by 
creating clouds, rather than the current favourite of seeding the atmosphere 
with sulphate aerosols. Such measures will only bring interim relief; they can-
not compensate for eternally rising carbon dioxide levels, which will make the 
oceans too acidic to support life. But they might be needed to provide space for 
adjustment. 
Let us proceed to a survey of perspectives on climate change that essays greater 
interpretive depth than found in Stern, Giddens, or ‘the Danish text’.
Hulme – Why We Disagree About Climate Change
Arguably, the cleverest people make the worst mistakes in front of complex 
problems, problems that exceed any single person’s capacities, for they are more 
likely to overestimate themselves and fail to consult and cooperate. One version 
of this insight comes from James Watson. He and Francis Crick identified the 
structure of life –the double-helix structure of DNA– at Cambridge University 
in 1953. Years later Watson reflected on why they won that scientific race. The 
reason, he said, was because they were not the cleverest in the race. As a result 
they did not rely on their own brilliance alone; instead they consulted inten-
sively. We can call this the Watson principle. By happy coincidence Watson is 
the name of Sherlock Holmes’ less than brilliant companion, Dr. Watson, so 
the principle is easy to remember. The Watson principle applies also in public 
affairs and policy analysis. Amongst social sciences, economics may have made 
the worst mistakes. Neglecting its own principles of gains from trade, it for too 
long sought, mercantilist style, only to export its products and not to import 
enough. Geography has not had this problem, and many of the best synthesisers 
in social sciences and development studies seem to come out of geography.
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Mike Hulme is a British academic geographer, who founded the Tyndall Centre 
for Climate Change Research. His 2009 book Why We Disagree About Climate 
Change diagnoses weaknesses in the perspectives on responding to climate 
change that are associated with the Kyoto Protocol and the Stern Review. In 
each chapter Hulme explores a further reason why people disagree about cli-
mate change.22 Very similar views are expressed in The Hartwell Paper (Prins et 
al., 2010), produced by a group of which Hulme was a member, consisting of 
fourteen rich country experts under the coordination of Gwyn Prins and Steve 
Rayner. It proposes a ‘radical re-framing’ of climate change and climate change 
policy.
Hulme and Prins et al., like Giddens, criticize Stern and the Kyoto process for 
in effect following the standard engineering-derived model of policy analysis: 
specify a problem structure, a problem tree, and then reverse it to define a solu-
tion structure: a solution tree and a corresponding series of required actions. 
That approach tends to hide many of the value choices involved in defining 
problems and selecting solutions. The issue of climate change is too multi-
faceted and disputed in nature to be addressed in this fashion, as if there is a 
single and omniscient decision maker, or one able to command and control 
others. Implicitly it is a government-centred approach, that leads the issue to 
the United Nations to coordinate action around the supposedly single correct 
interpretation of the problem. Climate change belongs however to the genus 
of ‘wicked problems’ identified by Rittel and Webber (1973). It has too many 
aspects, too many causes, too many effects, and relatedly too many uncertain-
ties, too much culturally- and ideologically-contingent interpretation, too many 
alternative problem formulations and too many possible relevant responses to 
be helpfully approached in a technocratic engineering style. To do so leads to 
the specification of supposed ‘solutions’ that have unmanageable coordination 
demands and are unimplementable. No authoritative shared interpretation is 
possible; too many countries are involved to get an international consensus, and 
most national governments are not able to, or simply do not, fulfil their prom-
ises. The outcome is: minimal change. Lack of interpretive nuance leads to lack 
of practical effectiveness.
Instead, argue Hulme and the Hartwell Paper, we must proceed step-by-step 
on innumerable different fronts, all treated separately rather than bundled 
together into an unnegotiable grand package. There should be an emphasis on 
learning through experimentation and debate, without expecting or requiring a 
consensus map of the terrain and plan of action. People can agree on an action 
for variety of different reasons; and even when they do not agree on actions dif-
ferent groups can each proceed with different but complementary actions. Like 
Giddens and Friedman, the Hartwell Paper stresses that this process involves 
finding compromises around feasible next steps, by identifying synergies with 
other priorities: economic development, basic needs fulfilment, health, energy 
efficiency and energy security. That can build a foundation of cooperation that 
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will ease other initiatives later. The Hartwell paper sees much scope for example 
for progress on controlling temperature-forcing agents other than CO
2,
 such as 
black carbon (soot) which may have contributed much to recent Arctic ice melt; 
and they advocate a politically feasible low carbon tax, not designed with imme-
diate punitive deterrent intentions but instead dedicated to funding research on 
alternative energy sources. This offers a path forward that is both feasible and, 
in time, inspiring. ‘Securing access to low-cost energy for all, including the very 
poor, is truly and literally liberating’ (Prins et al., 2010:35).
Despite this concluding flourish, something important is absent in the Hulme 
and Hartwell analyses: sufficient perspective from and for the South. In that 
sense they retain something in common with the hierarchist worldview that 
they argue led to the Copenhagen fiasco. Prins and Rayner have been campaign-
ing for some years to replace the Kyoto conception by the promotion of mixed 
approaches, with a focus on adaptation not on a unified blueprint for mitiga-
tion. Whether adaptation is as feasible and adequate for poor people in the trop-
ics as for the affluent in the temperate zones requires attention. 
Here I consider Hulme’s 400 page book, a full statement that gives ample 
oportunity to show his worldview. Hulme notes that which risks get stressed 
depends on who has voice. He claims that those who exercise ‘voice’ are the 
Green affluent classes in the North (Ch.6: The Things We Fear). Not highlighted 
as lacking voice are the poor in Africa, South Asia and the Pacific, nor are their 
risks highlighted. Later he quotes Steve Yearley’s view that ‘we are concerned 
about climate change not so much because of any substantive dimunition of 
human or non-human welfare that might ensue, but because of the strong ele-
ment of symbolism involved’ (Hulme, 2009:343). The ‘we’ here evidently encom-
passes rich Northerners, rather than Bangladeshis, Ethiopians or Pacific island-
ers.
The prospective costs discussed in Hulme’s chapter on valuation concern the 
loss of bits of the natural environment and associated aesthetic values (pp. 114-
5, 134): what is ‘the worth of a songbird’, he asks (p.134) ? The examples are 
not about retaining one’s life and health. Yet, to recall the World Development 
Report’s projection, business-as-usual warming might bring another three mil-
lion deaths per year from malnutrition. Rights-based arguments against global 
warming concern present generations in the South, not merely the unborn, for 
the negative impacts would not arrive only in 2100. Bangladeshi babies today 
face lives of seriously increased risk of fundamental dangers. Hulme outlines 
arguments for a high discount rate, that give no weight to the chance that 
future generations (those in Bangladesh, more than those in Britain) may be 
at risk of devastation, not merely of reduction of a super-affluence far above 
present day standards (p.122). His discussion of chances of disaster (pp.123-4) 
does not ask disaster for whom. Its examples are airport security and the risk of 
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a cooker malfunctioning; not drought or flood or famine affecting poor families 
who are unable to cope with them. 
The culture wars in the North preoccupy him instead. As a careful geographer, 
he is irritated by the sometimes sweeping claims and vague backing offered by 
deep Green activists, ‘deep ecologists’ (p.134), ‘radical deep ecologists’ (p.132). 
When he comes to distinguish views on sustainable development—‘market 
envíronmentalism’, ‘ecological modernisation’, and ‘environmental populism’ 
(pp.256-8)—only the last of them receives a pejorative (and inaccurate) title. 
The fears that deep ecologists express, for ‘the basic functioning of the planet’ 
(p.134), are not unique to them but are shared by many climate scientists and 
environmental scientists, as we saw earlier. 
Hulme treats ‘development’ in a separate chapter. After noting that issues 
look different from ‘Dacca’ (p.252), he spends the chapter on a re-run of the 
Bruntland-and-beyond debates on ‘sustainable development’, in other words on 
territory covered under different labels in earlier chapters, not on an attempt 
to see how the world looks from Dhaka. (The name of the capital of Bangladesh 
was changed in the early 1980s. Giddens likewise repeatedly misspells Darfur, 
as Dafur; 2009:205.) Bangladesh is a leading centre for the movement around 
climate justice, and for preparations for adaptation against prospective sea 
level rises, increased rainfall variability, increased glacial melt, and more fre-
quent tropical storms. It is not mentioned in Hulme’s twelve page index, nor 
in his Preface’s list of countries visited.23 Forty years ago, during a famine in 
Bangladesh, the philosopher Peter Singer raised the profile of the field of global 
ethics by arguing that response-ability implies responsibility. Rich individuals 
and rich countries have a moral obligation to help if they can, even if they have 
no immediate causal responsibility for the famine, he proposed. Climate change 
raises less disputable claims: the actions of rich countries that affect the climate 
in poor countries and jeopardise the lives and livelihoods of their peoples imply 
obligations to avoid, prevent and compensate for damage caused.
From now on we need to have a system where, for every 10,000 tonnes of 
carbon you emit, you have to take a Bangladeshi family to live with you. 
(Atiq Rahman, in The Independent newspaper, June 20, 2008; quoted by 
Dyer, 2010:56).
Hulme expresses scepticism over the hopeful (Bildungsroman) perspective 
from evolutionary psychology presented by Jonathan Haidt, that suggests that 
our moral attitudes can evolve relatively quickly towards a global perspective 
(Hulme, 2009:175-6), and scepticism too over the notion of ‘climate justice’, 
remarking that it is subject to numerous and conflicting interpretations (p.164). 
The same point applies for the notion of justice in general, and in any area of 
attempted application. It does not end the discussion. Much room exists for 
reasoned compromises and coalitions; but Hulme does not pursue the matter. 
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His interest lies elsewhere. Hulme and Hartwell still present the world as viewed 
from the rich North, looking down on or simply overlooking ‘Dacca’. This might 
be imprudent as well as indecent, suggest the authors whom we consider next.
Stories of Climate Wars or of Global Justice and Common 
Security
With Dyer’s book on Climate Wars we move closer to the real world, and not only 
as seen from London or Washington but as observed on the ground in diverse 
locations. Dyer remarks that the climate models and projections ‘stay well clear 
of any attempt to describe the political, demographic and strategic impacts of 
the changes they foresee’ (Dyer, 2010:3). And most of the projections produced 
by international organisations assume, in effect, that there will be no surprises 
– which would itself be an enormous surprise, for reasons we will come to. They 
thus fail to become convincing scenarios. The future forms of so-called ‘adapta-
tion’ will be far more than simply building dykes. We come to the necessary but 
typically underdeveloped Step 6 in the models of climate change. So one answer 
to what can social scientists do about climate change is to think about the pos-
sible human impacts and reactions. If climate scientists and social scientists 
do not study these possibilities enough, military planners worldwide are doing 
so, as in a recent American study called National Security and the Threat of Climate 
Change (CNA, 2007). 
What Step 6 scenarios suggest is: first, the ‘magnification of [the] physical effects 
by likely political and social responses’ (Dyer, 2010:16). Second, that ‘nonlinear 
climate change [occasional rapid shifts] will produce nonlinear political events’ 
(Fuerth, 2007:72). And third, unlike ‘the kind of approach that is often taken in 
public policy, which is that you only need to do THIS, and the problem will be 
solved now and forever’, we should instead ‘Expect that any solutions you apply 
are likely to disturb the system, leading to an infinite series of surprises’ (Dyer, 
2010:21; interview with Leon Fuerth). We might call this the narrative approach 
to public policy: stories will keep on unfolding, with periodic surprises.
Reviewing the historical record of human responses to environmental crises, the 
historian J.R. McNeill notes how troubles beget troubles. Disasters fuel mutual 
suspicions and religious zeal. People under pressure often get nasty. More 
elegantly stated: ‘Restraint and civility can quickly perish when confronted with 
imperious necessity. This much has been obvious to observers since Thucydides’s 
analysis of the Corcyran Revolution. .. [Political] reaction to shocks often [in 
history] took the form of scapegoating minorities and foreigners’ (McNeill, 
2007:29). McNeill’s analysis comes in a study called The Age of Consequences, from 
the Washington DC Center for Strategic and International Studies. In a sister 
chapter Gulledge warns against the myth that ‘climate change will be smooth 
and gradual. The history of climate reveals that climate change occurs in fits 
and starts, with abrupt and sometimes dramatic changes rather than gradually 
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over time’ (Gulledge, 2007:37). So the social impacts and forms of ‘adaptation’ 
could work out differently than suggested by the smooth curves in the interna-
tional reports.
The Age of Consequences builds three climate scenarios. To start with the least 
worrying, Scenario 1 traces the impacts of the IPCC’s main projection, through 
to 2040. ‘It is a scenario in which people and nations are threatened by mas-
sive food and water shortages, devastating natural disasters, and deadly disease 
outbreaks. It is also inevitable.’ (Podesta and Ogden, 2007:55). East Africa is 
the region with the highest risk of conflagration, because of the combination 
of expected intensity of climate fluctuations and the fragile and contentious 
political situations. The various component crises ‘are all the more dangerous 
because they are interwoven and self-perpetuating’ (p.56). Scenario 2 adds the 
early impacts of the dangerous feedbacks that were explicitly not included 
by the IPCC 2007 Report. It envisages warming of 2.6ºC by 2040. ‘Agriculture 
becomes essentially nonviable in the dry subtropics’ (Fuerth, 2007:71). More gen-
erally, human systems worldwide will come under major stress, and ‘massive 
nonlinear events in the global environment will give rise to massive nonlinear 
societal events’ (p.76). Scenario 3 in effect follows this story through to a world 
in 2100 that is 5.6ºC warmer and where the sea level has already risen two 
metres.24 The study then traces the possible diverse human impacts of these cli-
mate scenarios, as people and organizations react, leading to an infinite series 
of surprises. 
Dyer extends the approach. Let us take two of his eight imagined scenarios, 
remembering that scenarios are not predictions. 2010 has seen the Pakistan 
floods (they are not yet over), an extraordinary environmental disaster, due to 
exceptional rains apparently related to a La Nina event in the Pacific. Pakistan 
figures prominently in Dyer’s book. It has the largest contiguous irrigation sys-
tem in the world, a system that relies on river waters from the Himalayas. The 
shrinking of the Himalayan glaciers, which is proceeding rapidly, is envisaged 
to eventually cut off Pakistan’s winter water supply and lead to intense ten-
sions with India, from where several of Pakistan’s major rivers come. Pakistan, a 
country of 170 million people, with nuclear weapons, is already the world’s uni-
versity for armed Islamic militants. A fast growing population of unemployed 
young men could continue to provide recruits like the perpetrators of the 2008 
Mumbai massacres. 
Here is the gist of Dyer’s Scenario 4: 
..[It] had been widely predicted for decades: first the glaciers will melt, 
overfilling the rivers every summer—and then they will be gone, and the 
rivers will run dry in the summers. … [Eventually] it was life-and-death 
crisis for Pakistan… At least three-quarters of Pakistan’s food was grown 
on land that was irrigated by the Indus river system.25
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Leaders of the latest military coup in Pakistan look for ways to cement support. 
They demand that India renegotiate the Indus Water Treaty that allocates the 
waters of the Indus and its tributaries. Confrontation escalates. A Pakistani gue-
rilla attack on the turbines at the giant Bhakra Dam in India leads to a hardline 
nationalist government in Delhi, which seeks to force Pakistan to disarm terror-
ists. The military government in food-rationed Pakistan learns of Indian prepara-
tions to disable Pakistan’s nuclear delivery system. Pakistan secretes enough of 
its missiles to launch a successful large-scale nuclear attack on India when the 
Indian strike comes. India manages to retaliate.
Scenario 5 concerns a Bangladesh subject to ever more frequent and destructive 
cyclones. It finally threatens to unilaterally ‘upload a million tonnes of pow-
dered sulfates into the stratosphere—in order to cut incoming sunlight and drop 
the global temperature unilaterally—if there were not swift global agreement on 
doing it by less noxious means’ (Dyer, 2010: 161-162). This scenario has a happy 
ending. Not all the plausible scenarios for Bangladesh are like that. A country 
with a population almost equal to Pakistan’s, it is probably more subject to envi-
ronmental vulnerability. First from the overflow of rivers, fed by global warming 
that increases energy circulation, warms the oceans, boosts rainfall, and melts 
glaciers. Second from rising ocean levels that endanger a large part of a country 
already more than twice as densely populated as the Netherlands and with far 
less economic capacity to protect itself or adjust. Contrary to the common pic-
ture in Western literature and newspapers of feckless Southern nations that are 
responsible for their own problems—the picture given by John Rawls in The Law 
of Peoples or by Garret Hardin—Bangladesh has been exemplary in development 
innovation. Its own picture is that it is the home of Grameen, BRAC, Proshika, 
and a great new textiles sector, for example, but will suffer, indeed is already 
suffering, from environmental damage caused by others’ actions. It is subject to 
serious international restrictions on its exports, just as when ruled by Britain, 
who prevented Bengal textile exports and instead obliged opening up to British 
imports. Under British rule local subsistence entitlements were lost as Bengal 
was incorporated into global market systems. In contrast to the relatively effec-
tive pre-British responses to climate-related food crises, British rule saw a series 
of massive famines (Sen, 1981; Davis, 2001). Given Bangladesh’s combination 
of historic, current, and impending damage and grievance, security planners 
worldwide (e.g., Campbell et al., 2007) ponder scenarios in which the country 
becomes a second Pakistan, a second university for armed militants. 
The relevance of these sorts of scenarios does not depend on whether the causes 
of climate change are natural variation or greenhouse gas emissions or other 
human activity. They do not depend on whether some particular global average 
temperature is reached or not. Issues of Step 6 human adaptations to climate 
changes—including changed variance, more frequent extreme events, particular 
local climatic and environmental quirks—demand our fuller attention. 
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Strengths and weaknesses of the narrative form with specific reference to cli-
mate change are a topic for investigation in a new project that I participate 
in, coordinated by the University of Bergen. We are looking now at arguments 
about qualities of the narrative form, in its diverse versions, that are made in 
the literatures about other issues and contexts than climate change (see e.g., 
Whiteman & Phillips, 2008). The story form has a number of advantages when 
considering human trajectories. First, it provides descriptions that are not only 
more vivid but often more insightful. Documents like the Stern Review and 
the World Development Report have a rather limited cast of characters: for 
example, in some analyses just ‘developed’, ‘developing’, and ‘emerging’ coun-
tries. They lack specifics, and, related to that, we will see, they miss some of the 
resulting dynamics. Narratives and scenarios bring us to the concrete particu-
larity, the actual strange combinations, contiguities and coincidences that can 
and do occur. So, second, because stories can better respect complexity, they are 
better in giving understanding. A standard piece of advice in interpretive policy 
analysis is the Goldberg Rule: don’t ask people what’s the problem, ask them 
what’s the story. One will get deeper that way, including in identifying the 
real problems (Forester, 1999). Or one can ask the sister versions, ‘How has this 
issue come into your life?’, or ‘What did you do when that happened?’ (Forester, 
2009). People respond not with theory or speculation but with revealing narra-
tives. 
Third, stories are sometimes better for prediction. They show intelligently 
calculated, emotionally driven reactions. They do not shy away from consider-
ing the interactions between environmental, economic, social and political 
impacts that are beyond our ability to formally model. The Stern Review when 
costing possible impacts in rich countries does not include the feedback effects 
from economic crisis in ‘poorer countries who are more vulnerable to climate 
change..., with increasing pressures for large-scale migration and political insta-
bility’ (Stern, 2007:139). The Review recognises a whole series of such omissions 
(pp.169-73) but has no methodology for dealing with them. Centrally, stories 
think about ‘the diverse potentials of complex interactions… [and reveal] risks, 
possibilities and opportunities that can otherwise be overlooked. …. Scenarios 
help people to perceive connections and possibilities that their mental frames, 
routines and authority structures normally screen out’ (Gasper, 2010a:23). 
Stories consider the highly improbable combinations that could occur and that, 
if they do occur, would change everything. While any particular such combina-
tion is highly improbable, the chance of occurrence of some such world-changing 
improbable combination is much higher. Yet social science has too little interest 
in such ‘Black Swan’ events, argues Nassim Taleb (2010), since it cannot model 
them. So, fourthly, stories may be better in promoting preparedness even where 
we cannot predict.
Fifthly, stories can have strengths in promoting ameliorative action, though 
they also have many dangers. In interpretive policy analysis, telling one’s story, 
binnenwerk brochure gasper.indd   29 12/13/10   11:19 AM
30
showing one’s reasons, has the potential to establish a party as a recognised 
actor in the eyes of the other parties, and to provide information and mutual 
awareness that open up previously unseen possibilities in the mutual relation-
ships (Forester, 1999). Faced with clearly conflicting espoused values of differ-
ent parties, there is little point in addressing the conflict head-on. Instead it 
becomes essential to explore the worldview, history and humanity of each of 
the parties, to create the degree of mutual understanding and acceptance and 
to find enough pragmatic handles to be able to move forward. The stories of 
one’s interlocutors reveal that they are more multi-featured persons than in 
one’s stereotypes. Thus ‘when we face value- and identity-based disputes, we 
need to mine stories, not sharpen debates’ (Forester, 2009:71). Telling personal 
stories is important in global-scale issues too (Schaffer & Smith, 2004), given ‘the 
power of personal narratives to displace stereotypes and expectations’ (Forester, 
2009:126). 
Sixthly, stories and even scenarios can motivate us better. They feel more real 
and so have advantages in capturing attention, being remembered, and connect-
ing to action. They engage our emotions, which reinforces those advantages. 
They bring us closer to the lives and minds of other people, and show us the 
human significance of abstracted projections and generalized trends (Gasper, 
2010a; Raskin et al., 2002). Through stories we are emotionally educated, made 
both more knowledgeable and more sensitive in relation to others (Forester 
1999, Ch.2). Abstract talk cannot do most of this work. 
Much of the climate literature warns that doomsday scenarios can generate res-
ignation, disbelief and rejection, or strengthen individualist responses, includ-
ing seeking self-esteem through money, image and status (e.g., Hamilton, 2010). 
Stories need to move us beyond focussing only on problems: past, present or 
future. So scenarios planning exercises typically seek to identify plausible desir-
able paths too. Scenarios work shows how some of the benefits from inclusive 
story-making at micro-levels can be extended to much greater scales of opera-
tion. Much more work is needed on which types of narrative and scenario may 
be helpful for which tasks and contexts.
Exchanging stories is one part of the repertoire of potentially helpful steps for 
dealing with differences that we find from the literatures of interpretive policy 
analysis and planning. Three others, following Forester (2009:129), are, first: 
Steer people towards joint inquiry, rather than attempting to bargain a ‘deal’. 
‘Deal’ is Stern’s term for his ‘blueprint for a safer planet’. The language of ‘glo-
bal deal’ fits a detective-story type of analysis: people have fixed motives, from 
which we calculate the implications. We saw that his new book at the same 
time begins to try to transcend this oversimple and restrictive approach. Second: 
Focus on the future and on opportunities for cooperative actions. Such a focus 
tries to counter our ‘limited telescopic faculty’, and connects to scenarios think-
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ing. Third: Generate options and then focus on identifying information gaps and 
uncertainties, to be examined through the processes of joint inquiry.
Erasmus wrote that he spent his money on books, and then if he had some over, 
on clothes and food. To some observers the modern world seems, in contrast, 
to have embarked on an institutionalised permanent orgy, hoping that Mother 
Earth will still tidy up the effects, or that Superman will geo-engineer them 
away, risklessly, or that the poor of Bangladesh and elsewhere will quietly pay 
whatever price has to be paid. Some of the projected consequences will hit only 
in fifty or a hundred or more years time. But probably already some of the poor-
est face resulting malnutrition, famine, disease, war and displacement—the 
Horsemen of the Apocalypse and their fellow-riders. The Darfur crisis, for exam-
ple, appears partly triggered by population movements related to the drying up 
of Lake Chad, and is reported as the first of the Climate Wars.
Dyer’s climate wars scenarios thinking leads him to the conclusion that a form 
of cosmopolitan egalitarianism would be not only fair in some abstract sense 
but the only arrangement that could ensure long-term global peace and surviv-
al. The only plausible sustainable basis for a ‘global deal’ would be, he suggests, 
not a calculation of ‘what is the most we need to concede’ but a principle that 
conveys equality of esteem, such as that propounded by the Global Commons 
Institute: that ‘everybody on the planet is entitled to the same basic personal 
allocation of greenhouse gas emission rights, and that those who exceed that 
allocation must compensate those who use less than their allocated amount’ 
(Dyer, 2010:72). 
Interestingly, morally myopic thinking may tend to induce explanatory myo-
pia too. A focus only on one’s own interests can be associated with a shortage 
of attention to, understanding of, and flow of reliable information from other 
people. It may bring an underrecognition of interconnections that bind even the 
strong to the weak in a globalized world. Giddens (2009: 213ff.) considers that 
enlightened self interest provides solid arguments for rich countries to help 
poor countries to adapt to Northern-induced climate change. He notes the fail-
ure of the Bush-Cheney attempt at a ‘realist’ foreign policy regime of brusque 
use of military and economic power to enforce its own interests. In Friedman 
(2009)’s view this testosterone-driven folie de grandeur has proved to be the oppo-
site of realism: reinforcing rather than reducing American reliance on imported 
oil, and boosting often anti-American autocrats and dictators in oil- and gas-
exporting states plus Islamism worldwide (Friedman’s 1st Law of Petropolitics). 
Storytelling helps to make this web of connections clearer than do regressions 
alone.
No man is an island, and security can only be common security, worldwide. In a 
letter to a friend, Erasmus once wrote: ‘That you are patriotic will be praised by 
many and easily forgiven by everyone; but in my opinion it is wiser to treat men 
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and things as though we held this world the common fatherland of all.’26 Wiser, 
as well as nicer. Human security theory tries to organise and present these 
understandings, in ways that can bridge between different relevant disciplinary 
worlds and between academe and practice (Gasper, 2005; 2010b; Gasper and 
Truong, 2010). It has a person-level focus in evaluation and explanation, which 
leads it to a narrative orientation. It takes the spirit of development ethics, of 
Gandhi and Mandela: to consider the poor, to understand their vulnerability, 
and listen and learn; and also to try to understand the vulnerabilities of the rich 
and deal with their fears.
Conclusion
My conclusion can be brief. First, with reference to understanding and respond-
ing to climate change, the lecture has presented many assertions, some of them 
by me, most of them from a series of significant contemporary authors. I hope 
to explore some of these assertions in greater depth, and particularly the sys-
tems that they form, in cooperation with colleagues and students during the 
coming period. 
Second, in terms of approach, I hope to have indicated in this lecture a type 
of humanist interpretive and value-critical analysis and to apply it in more 
detailed fashion in the future work. A humanist approach links to the themes 
of human rights, human development and human security, which have to be 
extended to connect to approaches in policy research and policy analysis, policy 
design and evaluation. Such an approach requires interpretive sensitivity, a 
focus on human meaning-making, that problematizes the who and the what in 
politics, and the where, when and how. It also involves openness to and concern 
for humans everywhere, not only according to size of bank balance or nature 
of passport. Ethical humanism strengthens the methodological humanism, the 
interpretive orientation, for as we have seen moral near-sightedness tends to 
bring explanatory short-sightedness. Listening to the stories of people, ordinary 
people, worldwide, is both decent and wise. 
The case for listening-oriented global-oriented transdisciplinary work is the 
case for international development studies as a distinctive intellectual space. 
Development studies can add global perspectives that counter epistemic paro-
chialism and ethical parochialism. A global orientation reflects human inter-
connections both in terms of impersonal cause-and-effect systems and in terms 
of our affective links and moral sentiments: the two faces of human interac-
tion studied by Adam Smith, in his The Wealth of Nations and The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments respectively, or by Amartya Sen, in his Poverty and Famines and The Idea 
of Justice respectively. These are the themes of development studies at its best: 
to look at important interconnections across sectors, disciplines, and national 
boundaries, guided by a concern for people everywhere and in following genera-
tions too. Such an approach, broad in scope and perception and broad in senti-
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ments and sympathies, provides the rationale of a school of international devel-
opment studies, and is why I am grateful to be a member here.
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Afterword
I would like to thank several people. First and foremost, my family: my wife and 
life partner Shanti George, my mother, and my daughter Anisa, for their lov-
ing support and companionship. Second, the senior management of Erasmus 
University Rotterdam and of this Institute, for establishing several special aca-
demic chairs at ISS, including this one. Third, my colleagues past and present 
at ISS and elsewhere; including especially colleagues in the Public Policy and 
Management team and in the Staff Group on States, Societies and World 
Development. And fourth, some intellectual partners: Raymond Apthorpe, who 
brought me to ISS and who introduced me to interpretive analysis; Thanh-Dam 
Truong, who introduced me to a human security perspective and has generously 
brought me into her work on migration; Sunil Tankha, with whom I teach pol-
icy analysis, who has stimulated me to move further into environmental policy 
questions; and Asuncion Lera St. Clair at the University of Bergen, with whom I 
work on development ethics and climate change. Finally, my thanks to you all 
for your attendance today and your attention. With this, I conclude in the tradi-
tional way: ik heb gezegd.
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Endnotes
1  For example, Prins et al. identify tropospheric ozone as a serious contributor to warm-
ing and cause of much other damage, which could be cost-effectively attacked through 
air pollution regulation.
2  Humanism, as the concept emerged in Europe in the 14th and 15th centuries, meant 
the study of not only sacred Christian texts but of classical Greek and Roman texts 
too, and use of insights from those classical sources to enrich understanding and 
practice both of Christian religion and contemporary living. Renaissance humanism 
involved also rigorous attention to language, grammar, and original texts, notably the 
Greek originals of Christian texts. In the 18th century a further meaning was articu-
lated:
In 1765, the author of an anonymous article in a French Enlightenment periodi-
cal spoke of “The general love of humanity . . . a virtue hitherto quite nameless 
among us, and which we will venture to call ‘humanism’, for the time has come 
to create a word for such a beautiful and necessary thing.” [Quoted in Wikipedia 
entry on Humanism]
3  So, formulations of the scope and orientation of development studies by authors like 
Hettne (1995) have emphasised: an interest in understanding and helping to influence 
long term social and economic change and in informing current action; explicit value-
concerns broader than economic growth alone; and a global perspective, including an 
emphasis on global interconnections.
4  See also, e.g.: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2316875/pdf/
brmedj06263-0030.pdf, http://www.academicapparel.com/caps/Early-Academic-Dress.
html,
 http://oxford.emory.edu/audiences/current_students/commencement/history-of-aca-
demic-dress.dot,    
 http://www.tamiu.edu/commencement/documents/CommencementprogSpring09.pdf
5  I draw here on Stern (2010) and Gasper (2010a).
6  Giddens (2009:20) even claims the Arctic ice cap is less than half the size of 50 years 
ago, and that some average temperatures in the Arctic have reportedly risen 7 degrees.
7  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-11813578, 23 Nov. 2010.
8   Hamilton (2010: 197-8) with reference to Prof. Pier Vellinga of Wageningen 
University. Areas near the Poles experience much greater changes in average tempera-
ture than those near the equator.
9  ‘The warmest point of the [previous] interglacial period…was about 1ºC warmer than 
the present global average temperature [thus about 1.7ºC above pre-industrial levels] 
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for only a few centuries, yet saw an average sea level 4 to 6 metres higher than at 
present’ (Gulledge, 2007:41).
10  Hamilton goes further: ‘A planet 2.5 degrees warmer means most of the ice eventually 
melts, leaving the oceans 50 metres higher than they are today’ (2010: 193-4).
11  Greenland warmed by 10ºC in fifty years at end of the last ice age, about 12,000 years 
ago, claim researchers at the University of Copenhagen (as reported by Friedman, 
2009:157). Recurrent mass extinctions in the past have been through climate cycles; 
only one was through an asteroid.
12   Hamilton cites a survey reported in http:www.independent.co.uk/environment/
climate-change/climate-scientists-its-time-for-plan-b-1221092.html.
13   ‘A planet four degrees warmer would be hotter than at any time since the Miocene 
era some 25 million years ago. The world was virtually ice-free then’ declares Hamilton 
(2010:192).
14  The WDR 2009 reports, but doesn’t build on, how consumers often respond to notions 
of norms rather than to prices, e.g. they reduce their electricity consumption when 
they are informed how it ranks relative to others.
15   So Giddens is wrong to talk of ‘over-development’ (Giddens, 2009:72) for that con-
cedes the term ‘development’ to mere growth of economic activity. One must show 
instead that it can bring mal-development. Elsewhere he adopts the sensible term 
‘uneconomic growth’ (p.52), which has been shown repeatedly (by ISEW and other 
measures) for life in the US and UK since the 1970s.
16  Stiglitz comes in effect to the same point. For how to motivate his plans for counter-
acting global market failures, he turns at the end to the principle of universal human 
rights (2007:292).
17  Fig. 8 in the WDR ( p.15) assumes a huge CCS contribution in order to ensure a 2 
degree maximum rise trajectory. ‘Storage capacity of 1 bil lion tons a year of CO2 is 
necessary by 2020 to stay within 2°C warming’ (p.16), yet the Report observes that 
present storage is 4 million tons a year. 
18  Many purchases are not used. One survey found Australian households spend on aver-
age $1200 p.a. on goods they do not use, ‘more than total government spending on 
universities or roads’ (Hamilton, 2010:75).
19  Contemporary airports, airplanes and shopping malls are privileged sites of endless 
ingestion that exemplify the divorce from nature.
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20  The WDR 2010 tries hard not to locate itself too far from any powerful groups with 
respect to 2°C warming (p.3): ‘Immediate action is needed to keep warming as close as 
possible to 2°C. That amount of warming is not desirable, but it is likely to be the best 
we can do. There isn’t a consensus in the economic profession that this is the econom-
ic optimum. There is, however, a growing consensus in policy and scientific circles 
that aiming for 2°C warm ing is the responsible thing to do. This Report endorses such 
a position. From the perspective of development, warming much above 2°C is simply 
unacceptable.’
21  The German language has also a category of Entwicklungsroman (development novel), a 
story of general growth rather than self-cultivation (Wikipedia entry on Bildungsroman). 
Planned value change – reframing – was a topic (ch.9) in Stern’s 2005 book that 
presents his theorisation of development. Its 500 pages had no discussion of climate 
change (other than a minor illustration on p.58).
22  There is no mention of the funding provided by corporations and individuals with 
immense stakes in the fossil-fuel economy.
23  Bangladesh is mentioned once, with reference to an NGO project to help ‘vulnerable 
delta communities’ (Hulme, 2009:258).
24  Current temperatures equal those of 3 million years ago. ‘Sea level then was about 25 
meters higher than today’ (Woolsey, 2007: 83), but melting of the ice caps may take 
very long.
25 Dyer mis-dates the event in the 2030s, perhaps on the basis of an error in a WWF 
report that was repeated by IPCC 2007.
26  From Wikipedia entry on Erasmus, 25 Sept 2010 - Cited as from letter 480, to Budé’ 
(ed. Allen).
binnenwerk brochure gasper.indd   41 12/13/10   11:20 AM
In
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
In
st
it
u
te
 o
f 
So
ci
a
l 
St
u
d
ie
s
Inaugural Lecture 16 December 2010
Des Gasper
ISS is the International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam
International Institute of Social Studies
P.O. Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague
Location:
Kortenaerkade 12
2518 AX The Hague
The Netherlands
T +31 70 4260 419 
F +31 4260 759
E info@iss.nl
www.iss.nl
Address
D
e
s G
asp
e
r 
In
flu
e
n
cin
g
 th
e
 Clim
ate
INFLUENCING THE CLIMATE
Explorations in Interpretive 
and Value-Critical Policy 
Analysis
© Des Gasper, 2010
Material contained in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced for individual use or 
for research, scholarly or educational purposes. It may not be used in any way for profit.
For reproduction in compiled volumes, readers or inclusion in any information storage 
or retrieval system, the permission of the author is required. Requests should be sent to 
<information@iss.nl>.
In any subsequent use of this work, the author should be given appropriate acknowledgement.
Cover photo: Statue of Desiderius Erasmus in Rotterdam by Frank Versteegen, Rotterdam
Cover Inaugural Gasper.indd   1 12/13/10   11:30 AM
